Private Interference With an Individual\u27s Civil Rights: A Redressable Wrong under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by Roth, Virgil L.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 51 | Issue 1 Article 9
10-1-1975
Private Interference With an Individual's Civil
Rights: A Redressable Wrong under 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Virgil L. Roth
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Virgil L. Roth, Private Interference With an Individual's Civil Rights: A Redressable Wrong under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 120 (1975).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol51/iss1/9
PRIVATE INTERFERENCE WITH AN INDIVIDUAL'S CIVIL
RIGHTS: A REDRESSABLE WRONG UNDER § 5 OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT?
Fourteenth Amendment
Sec. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
Sec. 3. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; . . .in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one -or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance
of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, -or deprived -of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more of the conspirators.
I. Introduction
A. Background
Section 1985(3) of title 42, United States Code,' purports to provide a
right of action for injury resulting from a conspiracy to deprive "any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of the equal privileges and
immunities under the laws." Liability is based on acts in furtherance of a con-
spiracy designed to deprive a person or group of persons of these rights. Addi-
tionally, the acts must result in injury to the plaintiff's person or property, or
infringe upon his rights of national citizenship. Section 1983 of the same title2
provides a civil remedy for similar acts performed under color of law.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). The parent statute of § 1985(3) is Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. In response to the Ku Klux Klan's terrorist activities, the Recon-
struction Congress passed several laws in 1871 providing both civil and criminal remedies for
denial of the constitutional rights of the newly emancipated slaves. The entire statute was
popularly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. However, when Congress compiled
the Revised Statutes in 1875, it separated the criminal and civil provisions, with the antecedent
of § 1985(3) reenacted as part of Rav. STAT. § 1980 (1875). It has since been codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). For a more encompassing history of civil rights legislation, see
1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIvIL R IGHTS 591 (1970);
Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 331 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Avins].
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
[Vol. 51:120]
Notwithstanding the absence of "under color of law" language in §
1985(3), the Supreme Court held in Collins v. Hardyman' that a properly
stated § 1985(3) action must include an allegation that the defendants acted
under color of state law." Since both §§ 1983 and 1985(3) actions required
color of law, the comparative utility of § 1985(3) was severely diminished.
Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to allege only that he was deprived of one of
his fourteenth amendment rights.5 Section 1985 (3), on the other hand, requires
the allegation of a conspiracy, an act in furtherance of that conspiracy, an intent
to deprive one of equality before the law, and an injury to one's person, property,
or rights of federal citizenship. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,' however, the Su-
preme Court brought an end to the relative unimportance of § 1985(3).
The plaintiffs in Griffin were black citizens who had been forcibly stopped
and beaten on a Mississippi highway. Justice Stewart, in a unanimous opinion,
overruled Collins to the extent that it had "construed the . . . language of §
1985(3) as reaching only conspiracies under color of state law."7 The Court
considered two principal issues: (1) did Congress intend to include purely pri-
vate conspiracies within the scope of § 1985(3)?; and (2) if it did, does Con-
gress have the constitutional authority to prohibit the particular conspiracy in
question?
The Court answered the first question affirmatively. The clear wording of
§ 1985(3),' the judicial construction of its earlier criminal counterpart,' the
statutory context of the section,'0 and the legislative history of the statute' dic-
tated that the intended scope of § 1985 (3) includes purely private conduct.
3 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
4 Id. at 655.
5 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
6 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
7 Id. at 92.
8 The Court pointed out that the section simply speaks of "two or more persons in any
State or Territory," who "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of
another." 403 U.S. at 96. Noting that the "approach of this Court to other Reconstruction
civil rights statutes in the years since Collins has been to 'accord [them] a sweep as broad as
[their] language'" '(citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)), id. at 97, the Court held that "[o]n their face,
the words of the statute fully encompass the conduct of private persons." Id. at 96.
9 The criminal counterpart of § 1985(3) (previously Rv. STAT. § 1980 (1875)) was
REV. STAT. § 5519 (1875). In United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), the Court held
§ 5519 to be unconstitutional because the statute was "not limited to take effect only in case
[of state action]," id. at 639, but "was framed to protect from invasion by private persons,
the equal privileges and immunities under the laws, of all persons and classes of persons." Id.
at 637. The Griffin. Court also noted, 403 U.S. at 98, that in construing the closest remaining
criminal analogue to § 1985(3), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) (which also employs the words "If
two or more persons conspire .... ."), Justice Frankfurter, in United States v. Williams, 341
U.S. 70 (1951), concluded that "if language is to carry any meaning at all it must be clear
that the principal purpose of [§ 241], unlike [18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)], was to reach private
action rather than officers of a State acting under its authority." Id. at 76. "Nothing in [the]
terms [of § 241] indicates that color of State law was to be relevant to prosecution under it."
Id. at 78 (footnote omitted).
10 Justice Stewart pointed out that "[a]n element of the cause of action established by
[§ 1983] is that the deprivation complained of must have been inflicted under color of state
law. To read any such requirement into § 1985(3) would thus deprive that section of all in-
dependent effect." 403 U.S. at 99 (footnote omitted).
11 The Court found it significant that the House sponsor, Representative Shellabarger,
stressed in introducing the original bill that its intent was to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment against persons as well as states. 403 U.S. at 100, citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 69 (1871).
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In answering the second question, the Court avoided the major obstacle
which confronted Collins. Because the language of § 1985(3) and § 1 of the
fourteenth amendment are so similar, the Collins Court determined that the
fourteenth amendment was the constitutional basis for § 1985(3). Since the
fourteenth amendment applies only to state action,12 the Court read a state
action requirement into § 1985(3). This construction enabled the Court to
avoid the invalidation of the entire statute. The Griffin Court, on the other
hand, refused to take such a restricted view of the "equal protection" and "equal
privileges and immunities" language of § 1985(3)." The Court held that §
1985(3) need not be based on the fourteenth amendment, but that other con-
stitutional sources of congressional power could justify legislation against private
conspiracies that deprived persons of equal protection of the laws. 4 In the
instant case, the Court found that § 2 of the thirteenth amendment, 5 or Con-
gress' power to protect the right of interstate travel, 6 were adequate sources
of congressional power.
B. The Issue
In Griffin, the Court held that Congress intended § 1985(3) to provide a
civil remedy for injuries resulting from private conspiracies. The Court further
determined that either the thirteenth amendment or Congress' power to protect
interstate travel was sufficient constitutional authority for legislation against pri-
vate conduct.' At the conclusion of his opinion Justice Stewart stated:
In identifying these two constitutional sources of congressional power, we
do not imply the absence of any other. More specifically, the allegations of
the complaint in this case have not required consideration of the scope of
the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Griffin, then, did not determine whether an aggrieved party may bring an
action under § 1985 (3) alleging a private conspiracy to interfere with his four-
teenth amendment § 1 rights. One possible basis for this action is Congress'
power to proscribe private conduct through the implementive powers of § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment.' A proper response to this unanswered question of
Griffin requires an analysis of the conflicting conclusions reached by the various
12 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875).
13 403 U.S. at 96-97, citing United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1883).
14 Id. at 104.
15 The Court pointed out that there has never been any doubt of Congress' power to
impose liability on private parties under § 2 of the thirteenth amendment. 403 U.S. at 105.
Furthermore, according to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), "Congress
has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges
and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective
legislation." Id. at 440.
16 403 U.S. 105. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
17 For a general analysis of Griffin, see Comment, Section 1985(3) of Title 42, United
States Code Permits Civil Action Against Private Individuals Who Conspire to Deny Another's
Constitutional Rights, 40 FoRmnHAM L. REv. 635 (1972); Comment, Section 1985(3) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871: Color of Law Element Eliminated, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 199.
18 403 U.S. at 107 (footnote omitted).
19 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
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circuit courts, a treatment of some illusory resolutions, and an educated proposal
for the future.
II. The Case Law
A. § 1985(3) Proscribes Private Conduct: § 5 as a Basis
1. The Eighth Circuit: Action v. Gannon
Less than four months after the Supreme Court resolved Griffin, the Eighth
Circuit decided Action v. Gannon.2" Relying on § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the court held that § 1985(3) provides a remedy for injuries resulting
from a private conspiracy to interfere with the first amendment rights of wor-
ship.
21
Twenty-nine members of "Action," an interracial civil rights group, disrupted
church services in the St. Louis Cathedral. 2 The disruptions were continued on
several successive Sundays,22 leading the pastor of the Cathedral to obtain an
injunction against further demonstrations.2 4  Action appealed to the Eighth
Circuit. Restricting its analysis to the constitutionality of § 1985(3)25 and the
propriety of injunctive relief, 6 the court, sitting en banc, affirmed.27
After deciding that § 1985(3) was applicable to the instant conspiracy
2
20 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
21 Judge Mehaffy, concurring, did not reach the fourteenth amendment issue. 450 F.2d
at 1239.
22 For a list of the demands made on the various churches of St. Louis, see 450 F.2d
at 1229 n.4.
23 On two occasions demonstrators were forcibly removed from the church by the St.
Louis police. For a detailed' description of the various demonstrations, see 450 F.2d at 1229-30.
24 Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969). For an analysis of the district
court's memorandum opinion, see 23 VANx. L. Rmv. 413 (1970).
25 The district court had based its decision on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985(3)
(1970), and the accompanying jurisdictional statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(1), (3), (4) (1970).
26 The propriety vel non of equitable relief under § 1985(3) is beyond the scope of this
Note. Nevertheless, it may be mentioned that the court found injunctive relief to be a proper
remedy, relying on the Fifth Circuit decision of Mizell v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427
F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970). However, the Fifth Circuit effectively overruled Mizell in its recent
decision in Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974), relying on City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). The Supreme Court there found, equitable relief
to be outside the ambit of § 1983; consequently the Fifth Circuit viewed it to be outside the
scope of relief under § 1985(3) as well. 492 F.2d at 1157 n.2.
27 For general commentary on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Action, see 52 B.U.L. Rnv.
599 (1972); 37 Mo. L. Rlv. 525 (1972); 47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 584 (1972).
28 Seeking to avoid the creation of a general federal tort law by construing § 1985(3) to
reach all private conspiracies to violate civil rights, the Griffin Court placed restrictions on the
scope of the requisite motivation for conspiracy:
[Ihough the supporters of the legislation insisted on coverage of private conspiracies,
they were equally emphatic that they did not believe, in the words of Representative
Cook, "that Congress has -a right to punish an assault and battery when committed
by two or more persons within a State" [citation omitted]. The constitutional shoals
that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law
can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose---by requiring, as
an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation
stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. . . . The language requiring
intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities means that
there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators' action.
403 U.S. at 101-02 (emphasis in original). Hence, it was necessary for the Action court
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and that the effect of that conspiracy had been to deny plaintiffs their 'First
Amendment rights of freedom of assembly and worship,"29 the court considered
the availability of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment as a constitutional source
for § 1985(3). The court stated: "It is quite clear that neither the Thirteenth
to determine whether such "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" motivated the conspirators in this case. Notwithstanding that the primary motivation
of Action seemed to be economic-to channel "white money" into black problem areas-the
court was apparently swayed by the bare fact that nearly all demonstrators were black and
nearly all parishioners white; it held that the requisite animus existed. Nevertheless, it is one
thing for a person to foist his racial concerns on another who is wealthier than he, and who
incidentally happens to be of a different race; it is quite another thing to do so because the
other person is of a different race. The writer suggests that Action represents the first situation,
but that, in light of the above language from Griffin, is is only the second which demonstrates
the motivation that can give rise to a cause of action under § 1985(3). See Arnold v. Tiffany,
487 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1974).
Had the Action court found that the conspiracy was directed at "wealthy" people rather
than "white" people, it would have been confronted with another issue left open by the
Court in Griffin. In limiting the requisite motivational element of a § 1985(3) action, the
Griffin Court stated in a footnote: "We need not decide, given the facts of this case, whether
a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be
actionable under the portion of § 1985(3) before us." 403 U.S. at 102 n.9 (footnote omitted).
Since Griffin was rendered at least one court has held that § 1985(3) does not extend beyond
racially motivated conspiracies. Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co. (unreported opinion of
Judge Denney of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska), aff'd on other grounds,
505 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1974). See also 46 TULANE L. REv. 822 (1971); 25 U. MIAMI L. REy.
780 (1971); 47 WASH. L. REv. 353 (1971). But cf. 40 FORHAm L. REv. 635 (1972).
However, most courts appear to refuse to so limit the statute's coverage, and concentrate instead
on what is a sufficient nonracial class. Thus the following have been deemed sufficient alle-
gations of class status: Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975) (rea-
sonably well-defined group of environmentalists); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.
1973) (supporters of a political campaign); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972)
(sub silentio) (eight-member family); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D.
Pa. 1974) (women). However, the following were deemed insufficient: Bricker v. Crane,
468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972) (a "novel" class-physicians who had been allegedly discrimi-
nated against because of their testimony in malpractice cases-which was neither "readily
recognizable nor among those traditionally protected by the Civil Rights Act"); Jacobson
v. Industrial Foundation, 456 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1972) (a "vague" class composed of those
who had filed similar claims for workmen's compensation). Several courts have held that the
injured party need not allege actual membership in a class, but that an allegation of con-
spiracy to discriminate against one who is advocating the rights of those who are members
of such a class is sufficient. Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (advocate
of racial equality); Crawford v. City of Houston, 386 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (advo-
cate of rights of marijuana users); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supjp. 341 (W.D.
Pa. 1974) (advocate of racial equality). Clearly, however, a complaint alleging purposeful
discrimination towards an individual with no allegation of racial or otherwise class-based
motivation is fatally defective. Thomas v. Economic Action Comm., 504 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.
1974); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1973); O'Neil v. Grayson County War
Mem. Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Crabtree v. Brennan, 466 F.2d 481 (6th Cir.
1972); Ketschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); Railport v. Chase Manhattan
Capital Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). It is also clear that there must be a
nexus between plaintiff's class membership (or the advocacy of the rights of those who are
members) and his injury. Specifically, the plaintiff's injury must have resulted from a con-
spiracy precipitated by his membership in a certain group. Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216
(9th Cir. 1974); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1972); Fallis v. Toast-
masters International Inc., 467 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1972).
It can readily be seen that the constitutionality of § 1985(3) as an exercise of Congress'
power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment is not the only unsettled question in the arena
of actions under that statute. What constitutes a sufficient "class" for purposes of the
requisite "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action,"
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, is also noteworthy; however, discussion of the points is beyond the
scope of this Note.
29 The court in Action made only passing and conclusory statements about the nature
of the right allegedly deprived the plaintiffs. "The defendants . . . do not have a right to
enter the cathedral and disrupt the church services of the plaintiffs. Such disruption is an
intolerable violation of the rights of those engaged in worship." 450 F.2d at 1233 (emphasis
added). At another point the court also spoke of "the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights of
[October 1975]
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Amendment nor the Constitutional right to travel interstate can serve as a source
of power here. But we think it equally clear that Congress had power to reach
this'conspiracy under §§ I and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."3
While the Eighth Circuit conceded"' that the Supreme Court decisions
during and shortly after the Reconstruction period32 are frequently cited for the
principle that Congress does not have the authority under the fourteenth amend-
ment to proscribe private conduct,3" it nevertheless chose to rely on two con-
curring opinions in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Guest,"'
and on the conclusions of many commentators concerning the legislative history
and intended scope of the fourteenth amendment. In Guest, 5 the defendants
were charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241,3" the criminal counterpart
freedom of assembly and worship." Id. at 1234-35. The court, however, failed to enlarge
upon its novel theory that the first amendment protects against private as well as governmental
interference.
Broadly speaking, the Constitution confers two spheres of individual rights: those immune
from governmental interference (e.g., the second amendment guarantee of the right to law-
fully bear arms), and those immune from private as well as governmental interference (e.g.,
the thirteenth amendment guarantee of the right not to be held in involuntary servitude).
The wording of the first amendment leaves no doubt that the rights conferred there come
within the sphere of the former: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Con-
sequently, it has long been held that the rights of "freedom of religion," Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) and "freedom of assembly," United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875), are guarantees only against federal interference, and as incorporated in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, against state infringement. Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). About another first amendment freedom, that of free speech,
Professor Cox has observed:
We delude ourselves when we speak simpliciter of the "rights of individuals or groups
to freedom of speech" as if they were constitutionally protected rights in rem,
good against all the world regardless of the source from which they are derived. The
commands of the first and fourteenth amendments are directed only to govern-
ment. . . . The only rights exactly correlative to those duties are rights against
government, not against fellow citizens.
Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN. L. Rav. 199, 240
(1971) (footnote omitted). Thus, in criticizing the Eighth Circuit's holding in Action that
the defendants had denied the parishioners their first amendment "rights," one commentator
noted: "One looks in vain for judicial pronouncements which lend support to the proposition
that the Constitution protects those engaged in worship from private interference." 52 B.U.L.
REv. 599, 607 (1972). The writer went on to suggest that indeed the Action court had
asked the wrong question:
Instead of asking whether a citizen of the United States has a right to practice his
religion free from private interference, the court asked merely whether the plaintiffs
had been prevented from worshipping. Practically speaking, of course, Action
prevented the plaintiffs from conducting their religious services. Constitutionally
speaking, however, plaintiffs sustained no injury to their first or fourteenth amend-
ment rights.
Id. at 609. Clearly, then, since the plaintiffs had not been denied any "right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States," the § 1985(3) action should have been dismissed as failing to
state a cause of action.
30 450 F.2d at 1233.
31 Id. at 1235.
32 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
33 See, e.g., Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964).
34 383 U.S. 745, 761 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 774 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
35 For a general analysis of the Court's decision in Guest, see 52 CORNELL L. Ray. 586
(1967); 20 VAND. L. Rav. 170 (1966).
36 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970). Section 241 provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
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of § 1985(3), after allegedly causing the arrest of certain blacks by means of
false reports. Section 241, like § 1985 (3), purports to reach wholly private con-
spiracies. Nevertheless, the district court read a state action requirement into
§ 241,"7 failed to find state involvement, and dismissed the indictment for failing
to charge an offense under the laws of the United States."8
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the alleged facts, if
proven, might show a conspiracy with state officials. The Court was therefore
not required to decide the statute's constitutionality in the hypothetical context of
merely private action. Nevertheless, six Justices, in two concurring opinions,"'
gratuitously determined that even if the defendants did not conspire with state
officials, their conduct would still be prohibited by § 241. The basis of this con-
clusion was that Congress has power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to
punish private conspiracies that interfere with the rights guaranteed by that
amendment." Thus, in Action the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Supreme
Court would not reject the majority views expressed in Guest: "The Fourteenth
Amendment and § 1985(3), construed in Griffin, are too closely related with
respect to date of passage, authorship, and purpose to permit such a result with
consistency."'"
In addition to the concurring opinions in Guest, the Eighth Circuit relied on
the majority of commentators' position that the legislative history of the four-
teenth amendment indicates that § 5 enables Congress to reach private action.4"
The court concluded by noting that "[ihis interpretation of the Amendment
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege so secured -
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
37 This is, of course, the approach originally taken by the Supreme Court in Collins v.
Hardyman in an effort to avoid declaring the provisions of § 1985(3) unconstitutional. The
statute was then codified as 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) (1946).
38 246 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Ga. 1964).
39 383 U.S. at 761 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by Black & Fortas, JJ.); id. at 774
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Warren, C.J., & Douglas, J.).
40 In light of the long-standing practice of the Supreme Court to avoid treading new
constitutional ground in the absence of necessity, Justice Harlan characterized his colleagues'
voluntary pronouncements as "to say the least, extraordinary." 383 U.S. at 762 n.1 (Harlan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
41 450 F.2d at 1236.
42 Id. at 1236 n.15, citing J. TENBROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FouR-
TEENTH AmENDMENT (1951); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950); Note, Federal Civil Action Against
Private Individuals for Crimes Involving Civil Rights, 74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965) (supporting
the court's view). But see Avins, supra note 1 (arriving at a contrary conclusion). The court's
reliance on Frank & Munro, supra, as authority for its assessment of the legislative history of
the fourteenth amendment was clearly misplaced. The authors stated:
It was generally understood that Congress could legislate to secure [protection of
fourteenth amendment rights] without regard to whether the particular objection
was frustrated by state action or by state inaction. On the other hand, the clause
was meant to have no bearing . . . on segregation of a purely private sort in situa-
tions fairly independent of the law, as in churches, cemeteries, or private clubs.
50 COLUm. L. REv. at 168 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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would leave to Congress the question of the extent to which it desired to exer-
cise its power under the Amendment."'
3
2. The Fifth Circuit: Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co.
In Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co.," the Fifth Circuit followed the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Action,' holding that the fourteenth amendment,
43 450 F.2d at 1237. Judge Mehaffy, concurring in the result, expressly rejected the court's
"expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment," preferring to rest his decision solely on Griffin:
"The result in this case is compelled by [Griffin], since it is entirely clear that the defendants
disrupted the church services and in so doing there was racial invidious discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators' action." 450 F.2d at 1239.
44 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
45 Id. at 208. The court stated: "Today we hold that the [fourteenth] amendment and
the statute [§ 1985(3)] operate in tandem to provide .. .a cause of action. In so holding,
we join a unanimous en banc decision [Action] by the Eighth Circuit ...." However, in this
context the characterization of Action as a unanimous decision is inaccurate. As pointed out
previously, supra note 43, while Judge Mehaffy concurred in the result in that case, relying
on Griffin, he expressly rejected the court's fourteenth amendment reasoning. It might also
be noted that Chief Judge Matthes did not take part in the Action decision. 450 F.2d at 1229.
The Fifth Circuit in Westberry also cited a decision from the Third Circuit, Richardson
v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971), and a case from the Sixth Circuit, Cameron v.
Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973), as authority for the statement that § 1985(3) is a
valid exercise of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. The reliance on
either of these decisions was improper.
In Richardson, a Caucasian plaintiff sought recovery under § 1985(3), alleging that a
private employer discriminated against him by discharging him for inter alia criticizing and
opposing what he believed to be racially discriminatory employment practices, and for ad-
vocating racial equality in employment opportunities. The district court, in an unreported
decision prior to Griffin, dismissed the complaint for want of an allegation of state action.
The plaintiff appealed. In the interim, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Griffin.
In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit made no explicit ruling regarding the con-
stitutional basis for § 1985(3) as applied to the facts before it. The court simply stated:
"The Supreme Court [in Griffin] . ..has very recently reviewed the requirements for stating
a cause of action under Section 1985(3) and has, in effect, eliminated the necessity of state
action as formerly required by the narrow judicial interpretation expressed in Collins." 446
F.2d at 1249. Actually, the clue to the Richardson court's sub silentio assumption of a con-
stitutional basis for § 1985(3) on the facts before it lies in its treatment of the requirement
of Griffin that, to be valid, a § 1985 (3) complaint must allege that the conspiracy was motivated
by "a racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403
U.S. at 102.
The question facing this court is whether the allegations of plaintiff's complaint . ..
are sufficient to constitute the "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus" required by Griffin. While the question is very close, par-
ticularly because unlike Griffin the plaintiff is not a member of the class allegedly
discriminated against, we have concluded that, in light of the trend in recent de-
cisions to "accord [to the civil rights statutes] a sweep as broad as [their] language,"
Griffin [403 U.S. at 97],... the question must here be answered in the affirmative.
446 F.2d at 1249. Thus, the plaintiff was allowed, by virtue of his advocacy, to stand in the
shoes of the racial minorities allegedly being discriminated against. As such, the court's theory
would seem to have been that the thirteenth amendment provided an acceptable source of leg-
islative authority in the present case. The inference that the Third Circuit was relying on
the legislative power of the thirteenth amendment, rather than that of the fourteenth amend-
ment, is further supported by the court's sole reliance on Griffin, where the Supreme Court
clearly based its decision on the permissible scope of legislative power under the thirteenth
amendment, and expressly declined to rule on the applicability of the fourteenth amendment.
The Richardson court stated: "[we] conclude that the Griffin decision provides an adequate
basis upon which to conclude that plaintiff's complaint at least states a cause of action under
Section 1985(3)." Id. While the Third Circuit may well have been expanding certain aspects
of the Griffin decision, it is suggested that it would be untenable to assume, in the alternative,
that a court of appeals was deciding an issue of the constitutional and jurisprudential mag-
nitude of the one left open in Griffin, sub silentio.
The Fifth Circuit's reference to the Sixth Circuit decision Cameron v. Brock in holding §
5 of the fourteenth amendment to be an appropriate source of legislative power behind §
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in tandem with § 1985(3), affords a civil remedy for a conspiracy to deprive a
person of equal protection of the laws or of the equal privileges and immunities
under the laws. The court clearly recognized the innovative nature of its hold-
ing: "This case pushes us to the frontiers of Fourteenth Amendment interpre-
tation."4 Shortly after Westberry was decided by a three-judge panel, however,
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reheard the case and withdrew the opinion on
the ground of mootness. 7 Notwithstanding that the original Westberry opinion
is without the force of precedent, it was not rejected on its reasoning, and there-
fore can serve as an aid to understanding the current conflict surrounding the
issue under consideration.
In Westberry, plaintiff brought an action under § 1985(3) against a paper
company and its agent, counsel, and vice president," alleging that the defendants
had conspired to murder him and cause his dismissal because of his environ-
mentalist activities. Noting that § 1985(3) requires a "class-based" animus and
that Westberry merely alleged a conspiracy directed at an individual, the district
court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgement and dismissed
the complaint.4 9
On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff might be able
to show that he was a member of a well-defined class of environmentalists;"0
therefore, the district court's jurisdictional ruling was improper. The court then
proceeded to consider the issue of "whether section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-,
ment allows Congress to pass legislation effective against private parties if Con-
gress believes such legislation is necessary to insure due process and equal protec-
1985(3) is totally unhelpful. In Cameron, the plaintiff, a supporter of an incumbent sheriff's
election opponent, alleged that he had been arrested and incarcerated while distributing
campaign pamphlets, pursuant to a conspiracy among the sheriff and his deputies to deprive
plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws. Like Richardson, the primary, if not the sole,
issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff had made a sufficient allegation of "racial or other-
wise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." (For a discussion of the conflicting
resolutions of this issue left open by Griffin, see note 28 supra.) Indeed there was no legislative
jurisdiction issue at all, as the alleged conspirators were concededly acting under color of state
law. Hence, with state action present, § 5 of the fourteenth amendment was a patently obvious
source of legislative power to enact § 1985(3) even under the old Collins v. Hardyman test.
See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra. Cameron was clearly inapposite to the facts before
the Fifth Circuit in Westberry.
46 Id. at 207.
47 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc, per curiam).
48 The district court expressly declined to rule on whether the statutory requirement that
"two or more persons . . . conspire or go in disguise on the highway" is satisfied by proof that
a discriminatory business decision reflects the collective judgment of two or more executives,
officers, agents, etc., of the same company. Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 60 F.R.D. 447,
454 (S.D. Ga. 1973). However, the court took note of Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190
(7th Cir. 1972), where the Seventh Circuit held that
[I]f the challenged conduct is essentially a single act of discrimination by a single
business entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in the decision or in the
act itself will normally not constitute the conspiracy contemplated by this statute [§
1985(3)1.
Id. at 196. Accord, Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 505 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1974); Cohen
v. Illinois Institute of Tech., 384 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. I1l. 1974). See generally Nelson Radio &
Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953)
(corporation cannot conspire with itself).
In upholding the complaint in Westberry, the Fifth Circuit made no mention of this
issue.
49 Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 60 F.R.D. 447, 445 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
50 507 F.2d at 209-10.
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tion."'" Closely tracking the rationale of the Eighth Circuit in Action, the Fifth
Circuit sustained the constitutionality of § 1985 (3) as applied to the facts, basing
its decision on the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment, 2 the separate
opinions in Guest, and previous decisions upholding judicial power to deal with
individual activities which prevent the state from performing its fourteenth
amendment duties."3
The court in initially addressing the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment relied on the conclusions of various commentators who have analyzed
the amendment's history. While noting opposing views,"M the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the majority of those commentators that "the fourteenth amendment
permits Congress to legislate against private actions."55 The court recognized
that Alfred Avins was primarily responsible for the opposing position; 8 Avins
argued in Katzenbach v. Morgan" that most supporters of the fourteenth amend-
ment did not intend that it apply to private intrusions.5" Since Katzenbach was
decided before Guest, where six Justices concluded that § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment enables Congress to reach certain private actions, the Fifth Circuit
inferred that a majority of the Guest Court had at least impliedly rejected Avins'
assessment.59
The court then reviewed the Guest opinions.6" Like the Action court, the
Fifth Circuit placed considerable weight on selected quotations from the concur-
ring opinions of Justices Clark and Brennan, the substance of which was that
"§ 5 [of the fourteenth amendment] authorizes Congress to make laws that it
concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right created by and arising under
that Amendment.'l
Finally, the court noted that "a long-standing series" of circuit court cases"
"have upheld judicial power to deal with individual activities aimed at prevent-
ing the state from performing its Fourteenth Amendment duties."" Recognizing
51 Id. at 211.
52 The court actually stated that it was relying on the legislative history "behind the Act,"
but in fact the entire discussion involved the history of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
53 Id. at 211-12.
54 Id. at 212. See list of authorities cited at note 42 sup ra.
55 Id., quoting from R. FIAcs, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 277
(1908); B. HARRIs, QUEST FOR EQUALITY 53 (1960); J. TENBRoEK, ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGnrNS
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 186-87, 217 '(1951); and citing Frantz, Congressional Power
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1960).
56 Id. at 213 n.7, citing Avins, supra note 1. See also, Avins, Federal Power to Punish In-
dividual Crimes Under the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 43 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 317 (1968).
57 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
58 In oral argument before the United States Supreme Court in Katzenbach v.
Morgan ... this author said: "I will say that I think it would be necessary for the
Department of Justice to burn the Congressional Globe debates if they were to con-
vince anybody that the original understanding was in accordance with this statute."
Record of Argument, p. 49-50.
Avins, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. at 381 n.249.
59 Id. at 212 n.8. The Eighth Circuit had previously made the same observations in Action,
450 F.2d at 1236 n.15.
60 383 U.S. at 761 (Clark, 3., concurring, joined by Black & Fortas, 3J.) ; id. at 774 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Warren, O.J., & Douglas, 3.).
61 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
62 507 F.2d at 213, citing Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th. Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 932 (1959); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834
(1957); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
63 Id. (footnote omitted).
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that these cases rested on judicial rather than legislative authority, the court con-
curred with Professor Cox who contends that Congress' § 5 powers must be at
least as broad as the authority of the court. 4
The court admitted, however, that there was a further distinction between
this line of cases and the facts before it. In each of the cases involving judicial
protection against private invasions of rights normally protected only against
state infringement, there was an immediate relationship between the state and
the injured party. Nevertheless, the court stated:
A constitutional distinction cannot reasonably rest on the mere presence or
absence of a non-injuring state representative if we are to retain the [four-
teenth] amendment's focus on protection of the victim. Once it is recognized
that private actors may be curtailed to insure equal protection of the laws,
Congress has the responsibility to determine at what point along the con-
tinuum of private activities it wishes to provide a cause of action.65
The Fifth Circuit also determined that two early Supreme Court decisions
established Congress' power to prohibit private action which interferes with
fourteenth amendment rights. In United States v. Waddell,66 the Court held
that a private party conspiracy aimed at driving homesteaders from their feder-
ally bequeathed land could be punished by congressional mandate, on the theory
that the conspirators had attempted to frustrate the enjoyment of a federal right.
And in Logan v. United States,6" the Supreme Court sustained the prosecution
of a private conspiracy to physically harm a prisoner in the hands of a United
States marshall. In the view of the Fifth Circuit, Waddell and Logan provided
at least inferential support for its holding in Westberry.
B. § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment Is Not a Basis for § 1985(3) Actions
Against Private Conduct
1. The Seventh Circuit: Dombrowski v. Dowling
In Dombrowski v. Dowling,6" the Seventh Circuit held6 that a wholly pri-
vate discrimination against an attorney practicing criminal law does not deprive
him of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of § 1985(3)." The
district court, after finding that the manager of a large office building had con-
spired with other agents of their common employer to refuse rental of office
space to the plaintiff because he practiced criminal law and thereby would in-
64 Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HAPv. L. REv. 112 (1966).
65 507 F.2d at 214.
66 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
67 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
68 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
69 Id. at 196.
70 The Seventh Circuit also found plaintiff's complaint failed to allege an actionable "con-
spiracy":
[I]f the challenged conduct is essentially a single act of discrimination by a single
business entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in the decision or in the




crease security risks,"' sustained the plaintiff's § 1985(3) action and granted an
injunction restraining the defendants from renting the suite in question to anyone
other than the plaintiff. On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding it essen-
tial to distinguish between alleged "proscribed conduct" and claimed "protected
interest" when considering § 1985(3)'s state action requirement." The court
determined that Griffin's elimination of the state action requirement was limited
to "proscribed conduct." Conversely, when the alleged "protected interest" is
a right to "equal protection" necessarily based on the fourteenth amendment,
"a 'state involvement' requirement must survive Griffin."78 Finding no involve-
ment by the State of Illinois, the court held that § 1985(3) could not serve as a
basis for the injunction.
The Seventh Circuit construed the Guest opinions differently than did the
Eighth and Fifth Circuits. One of the charges in Guest was a conspiracy to deny
black citizens their right to equal utilization of public facilities operated by the
State of Georgia. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that both Justices Clark"
and Brennan"5 were acutely aware that the indictment charged a conspiracy to
deny equal benefits to a state-created facility. This action by the state was the
dispositive distinction between Guest and the facts presently before the court."'
The court concluded: "Since the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Thirteenth,
affords the plaintiff no protection against discrimination in which there is no
state involvement of any kind, a private conspiracy which arbitrarily denies him
access to private property does not abridge his Fourteenth Amendment rights."
7
2. The Fourth Circuit: Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc.
In Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc.,78 the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected
the Eighth Circuit's extension of Griffin" and aligned itself with the Seventh
Circuit in Dombrowski.
The plaintiff in Bellamy, a former employee of the defendant private
corporation, was dismissed from his employment because he was allegedly a
member of the "United Klans of America." He brought a § 1985(3) action
for damages and reinstatement, claiming the dismissal resulted from a conspiracy
which interfered with his freedom of political association. The district court
dismissed the complaint and held that the right of political association, emanating
as it does from the first and fourteenth amendments, is not protected from private
invasion."'
On appeal the Fourth Circuit considered the issue "whether the right of
association is protected against private interference."8 " The court did not refer
71 The opinion of Judge Parsons of the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois is unreported.
72 Id. at 195.
73 Id.
74 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 780-81 (Brennan, 3., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
76 459 F.2d at 196.
77 Id.
78 508 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1974).
79 Id. at 507.
80 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973).
81 508 F.2d at 505.
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to Dombrowski or to the "proscribed activity-protected interest" dichotomy, yet
it did express concern whether allegations of private interference with freedom
of association would satisfy § 1985(3)'s requirement for a deprivation of "any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." '82
Affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the use of
equal protection language by the Reconstruction Congress indicated that private
conspiracies to deny a person the right of free association are not actionable
under § 1985(3). To hold otherwise would contradict the explicit wording of
the first amendment and extend the incorporation doctrine to private persons, a
step taken by the Eighth Circuit in Action.83 After holding that § 5 of the four-
teenth amendment enables Congress to prohibit private conduct, the Action
court had reasoned that since the first amendment freedom of religion is incor-
porated into the fourteenth amendment, Congress has the authority under § 5
to reach private conspiracies that interfere with first amendment rights." The
Fourth Circuit in Bellamy, however, declined to likewise extrapolate from the
statutory language tracking the fourteenth amendment, to the fourteenth amend-
ment itself, to incorporation of the first amendment, and finally to applying the
first amendment to private persons without any state involvement.8 5
The court concluded that the outer limit of congressional power under § 5
of the fourteenth amendment was to aid the states in fulfilling their § 1 duties:
assuring equal enjoyment" of state-created rights or facilities. Thus, while recog-
nizing that state action is not always a necessary ingredient under § 1985(3),
the Fourth Circuit determined "that some state involvement is necessary in this
particular application of the statute in order to maintain a cause of action."8 "
III. Criticism
A. Illusory Resolutions
1. The Distinction Between Fourteenth Amendment § 1 Rights
and § 1985(3) Rights.
Courts that decide this issue without distinguishing between individual
rights under § 1 of the fourteenth amendment and rights conferred under §
1985(3) as an exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the amendment fail
to accurately discern the question. The Seventh Circuit ignored this distinction
82 Id. at 506.
83 See note 29 & accompanying text supra.
84 One commentator made the following analysis of this aspect of the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Action: "Thus, the Eighth Circuit ... combined the incorporation doctrine of the
due process clause, Griffin's reading of section 1985(3) and Justice Brennan's Guest concur-
rence to eliminate the 'state action' limitation from the Bill of Rights." Note, Federal Power to
Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruc-
tion Era Amendments, 74 COLUm. L. Rav. 449, 516 (1974) (footnote omitted).
85 508 F.2d at 507. Prior to this statement the court had said: "It is perfectly true that
the first amendment now speaks to the states by way of the fourteenth amendment, but to say
that it also speaks to private persons seems to us an innovation that must come from the
Congress or the Supreme Court." Id.
86 Id. at 506.
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in Dombrowski v. Dowling, holding that "a private conspiracy which arbitrarily
denies [a person] access to private property does not abridge his Fourteenth
Amendment rights." 8 The court apparently emphasized § 1 of the fourteenth
amendment to the exclusion of § 5.88 While § 1 provisions must be considered
in determining the scope of Congress' implementive powers under § 5, they do
not control that scope. Indeed, in one of the most recent references to Shelley v.
Kraemer's statement that the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield against
merely private conduct,"8 the Supreme Court added this caveat: "This is not
to say, of course, that Congress may not proscribe purely private conduct under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.""0 Whether or not it is ultimately determined
that the § 1 terminology "no State shall.. ." is dispositive of the issue, the con-
stitutionality of § 1985(3) as an exercise of § 5 powers can only be determined
by examining the potential scope of the latter section.
2. Improper Use of Prior Cases
In Griffin, Justice Stewart made the following observation: "The approach
of this Court to other Reconstruction civil rights statutes in the years since Collins
has been to accord [them] a sweep as broad as [their] language."0 " In the orig-
inal Westberry opinion, the Fifth Circuit, referring to § 5 legislative powers,
stated: "[T]he Court has accorded reconstruction civil rights statutes 'a sweep
as broad as their language,' which standard would allow the application of §
1985 (3) here."8 2 In making the above statement in Griffin, Justice Stewart had
been considering whether Congress actually intended § 1985(3) to apply to
purely private conspiracies. The question still remained "whether Congress had
constitutional power to enact a statute that imposes liability. .. .," In its use
of the Griffin statement, the Westberry court confused legislative intent with
legislative jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit in Action offered the following rationale for its holding:
"[The Court's decisions in a number of recent cases reveal a purpose to protect
the rights of citizens against private invasion by expanding the concept of State
action to situations where the showing of such action would, at another time,
have been considered insufficient." 4 This trend may be instructive in deciding
a case which involves at least indirect state action, but it was singularly uninstruc-
tive in Action where there was no trace of state involvement. It is patently
improper to use language which merely indicates a liberalizing of the state action
requirement as support for a total circumvention of that requirement.
87 459 F.2d at 196.
88 Id. at 194.
89 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
90 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973) (citation omitted).
91 403 U.S. at 97.
92 507 F.2d at 210.
93 403 U.S. at 103.
94 450 F.2d at 1236, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Sullivan




3. Improper Emphasis on Legislative History
While legislative history is often an invaluable interpretative device, the
substantial reliance on the congressional debates in the present context is mis-
placed. The legislative "intent" underlying § 1985(3) is no longer at issue.
After examining the various provisions of the original Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 and the legislative history surrounding its enactment, the Griffin Court
concluded: "It is thus evident that all indicators-text, companion provision,
and legislative history-point unwaveringly to § 1985(3)'s coverage of private
conspiracies." 6
The Court has not ruled so unequivocally on the original intent of the
framers of the fourteenth amendment. Whether the Reconstruction Congress
intended § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enable Congress to prohibit private
interference with § 1 rights is still undecided." There were several factions
debating the scope of the amendment's coverage.9" The only unimpeach-
able conclusion is that "the intent of the framers... was not clearly expressed
in the course of the discussion."" It is improper to contend, then, that the con-
gressional debates clearly demonstrate a solid majority opinion concerning the
scope of the fourteenth amendment.' 0 Whether Congress may proscribe purely
private conspiracies under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment cannot be answered
on the inconclusive and speculative basis of the congressional debates.
4. Undue Reliance on Guest
To determine the scope of Congress' § 5 powers by unduly emphasizing
the Guest opinions is inappropriate. Commenting on the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in Action, one writer noted, "[D]espite the significance of its decision, the
Action court rooted its holding on little more than the concurring opinions in
Guest."'o'
As indicated above, Guest involved an alleged violation of § 241, the crimi-
nal counterpart of § 1985(3). The indictment alleged that one object of the
95 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
96 403 U.S. at 101.
97 See, e.g., R. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); B. H.st-
RIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1960); E. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1956) ; S. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE or FIFTEEN ON RECON-
STRUcTION (1914); J. TENBROEx, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
WENT (1951); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 I-Asv.
L. REV. 1 (1955); Boutin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 19 (1938); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutioual
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1954); Fairman, A Reply to Professor
Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REY. 144 (1954); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Frank &
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV.
131 (1950); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Pri-
vate Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7
STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954); Graham, The Early Antislavery Background of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1950 WIs. L. REV. 479, 610; Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938).
98 37 Mo. L. REv. 525, 529 (1972).
99 52 CORNELL L. REv. 586, 591 (1967).
100 But see Avins, supra note 1, at 381 n.249.
101 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 584, 587 (1972).
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conspiracy was to bar the exercise of the "right to the equal utilization, without
discrimination upon the basis of race, of public facilities . . . owned, operated
or managed by or on behalf of the State of Georgia or any subdivision thereof."'0 2
Since all the defendants were private parties and there was no suggestion that the
State of Georgia was implicated in their conduct, Guest might well have been
valid precedent for determining the scope of Congress' § 5 powers. The Court,
however, obviated the necessity of reaching this question by construing the indict-
ment to allege that the conspiracy involved state officials.' The declarations
by the six concurring Justices that Congress had the power to proscribe private
interference with fourteenth amendment rights were merely dicta."" Because
Guest was decided on a theory of state involvement and because the statements
in the concurring opinions were dicta, Guest is tenuous precedent for determining
Congress' § 5 powers. Furthermore, only two of the six concurring Justices
remain on the Court-Justices Douglas .and Brennan. As noted by Professor
Cox, the Court as presently comprised "seem[s] somewhat more cautious than
their predecessors in constitutional innovation."'0 5
To the extent that the Clark and Brennan opinions are specifically employed
as persuasive authority, they must be limited to their scope. Justice Clark viewed
the question to be "whether Congress, by appropriate legislation, has the power
to punish private conspiracies that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment
rights, such as the right to utilize public facilities.""' Justice Brennan made
this distinction even clearer: "Whatever may be the status of the right to equal
utilization of privately owned facilities ... it must be emphasized that we are
here concerned with the right of equal utilization of public facilities owned or
operated by or on behalf of the State.""'
It is this qualified conception of the issue which casts suspicion on Action's"
and Westberry's"'9 reliance on Justice Brennan's statement that "§ 5 empowers
the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state
action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.""'  Certainly, both
Justices Clark and Brennan rejected the traditional notion that state participation
is essential to the validity of § 5 legislation designed to protect the enjoyment
of § 1 rights. But neither suggested that affirmative state action in creating those
rights is not a necessary prerequisite of § 5 protection. On the contrary, Justice
Brennan's characterization of the fourteenth amendment right to use state facil-
ities without discrimination emphasizes the importance of state action in the
creation of that right:
[IThe right to use state facilities without discrimination on the basis of race
is... a right created by, arising under and dependent upon the Fourteenth
102 Guest, 383 U.S. at 747 n.1.
103 Id. at 756-57.
104 Id. at 761-62, 774-86.
105 Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN. L. Rav. 199,
241 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
106 383 U.S. at 762 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 780-81 (emphasis in original).
108 450 F.2d at 1235.
109 507 F.2d at 213.
110 383 U.S. at 762.
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Amendment .... The Fourteenth Amendment commands the State to
provide the members of all races with equal access to the public facilities it
owns or manages, and the right of a citizen to use those facilities without
discrimination on the basis of race is a basic corollary of this command.-"1
Justice Brennan simply maintained, then, that when a state takes affirmative
action, such as the construction of public facilities, the fourteenth amendment
imposes certain duties on that state and grants its citizens certain correlative
rights. Rather than completely abrogating state action as a prerequisite to the
creation of fourteenth amendment rights, the Guest opinions simply expanded
the type of state activity which gives rise to a protectable fourteenth amendment
interest." 2 These opinions, therefore, should not be invoked as authority for
the broad proposition that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress the
power to reach private interference with fourteenth amendment rights "with or
without state action.""'
B. A Rejection of the Eighth and Fifth Circuits' Theories:
§ 1985(3) Is not a Federal Tort Law
The Eighth Circuit held in Action v. Gannon that the district court had
properly construed § 1985(3) to afford injunctive relief against a private con-
spiracy to disrupt religious services. Prior to its being vacated on the ground of
mootness, the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co. was
that the same statute provides a civil remedy for injury resulting from a private
conspiracy to dismiss an employee because of environmentalist activities. As
Judge Morgan stated in his dissenting opinion in Westberry: "[The] majority
opinion turns 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) into a 'general federal tort law.'
The rationale of Action and Westberry is that any conspiracy motivated by
a class-based discriminatory animus which infringes upon a right secured by the
fourteenth amendment is actionable under § 1985(3). The logical extension of
this rationale is that civil rights statutes formerly used to protect fourteenth
amendment rights against state interference can also give rise to a federal tort
action against private persons. The Action and Westberry decisions effectively
111 Id. at 780.
112 One commentator has summarized the limited scope of the Guest opinions as follows:
It is thus reasonable to conclude that while these justices were willing to reject the
traditional notion that Congress can act only to remedy or prevent positive dis-
criminatory action by the state, both Justices Clark and Brennan recognized the need
for at least some connection between the individual and the state before the fourteenth
amendment powers of Congress can come into play. In Guest, this necessary "con-
nection" arose once the state had taken the sort of action which gave rise to govern-
mental duties and correlative individhal rights under the fourteenth amendment, that
is, the construction of public facilities [footnote omitted]. The separate opinions,
therefore, can be understood to have gone no further than to assert that this type
of state action is all that should be required before Congress is allowed to exercise
its section 5 powers. This position, however, though substantially lessening the re-
strictive impact of the state action theory in relation to Congress' section 5 powers,
does not remove the "state action" element entirely.
52 B.U.L. Rlv. 599, 613-14 (1972).
113 This is, of course, the broad interpretation placed on the Guest opinions by the Eighth
Circuit in Action, 450 F.2d at 1235-36, and by the Fifth Circuit in Westberry, 507 F.2d at 213.
114 507 F.2d at 216.
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eliminated the "state action" requirement from the Bill of Rights. The Eighth and
Fifth Circuits contended that since the first amendment was incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment, the only issue was the potential limiting effect of the
fourteenth amendment's state action requirement. The courts completely ignored
the state action requirement which inheres in the first amendment as well. Con-
sequently, unless some arbitrary distinction is drawn between the first amend-
ment "rights" allegedly violated in Action and Westberry and other rights
secured by the Bill of Rights, this theory dictates that every right secured in the
Bill of Rights which has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment may
be protected from private interference by federal law enacted pursuant to § 5.
This construction has far-reaching ramifications. Since it is the due process
clause, and not the equal protection clause, that is being enforced, there is no
"racially or perhaps otherwise class-based, discriminatory animus" requirement.
Furthermore, since Congress' powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment
are the "same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause,"
1
Congress could enact a comprehensive civil code designed to provide civil relief
for private deprivation of all rights inhering in the basic concept of due pro-
cess." 6 Indeed, since § 1985(3) and its criminal counterpart § 241 have been
interpreted as a unit,"' a very reasonable extension of the Action-Westberry
theory is that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment permits Congress to enact a
national criminal code to ensure that no person is deprived of his life, liberty or
property without due process of law, so long as Congress makes the requisite
specific intent an element of the crime."'
This conceptual test of Action and Westberry illustrates the impropriety
of those decisions. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Griffin has already impliedly
rejected such a construction of Congress' § 5 powers. Justice Stewart, after
concluding that the Reconstruction Congress intended to include private con-
spiracies within the ambit of § 1985 (3),"' stated:
That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, however, mean
that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences
with the rights of others. For though the supporters of the legislation in-
sisted on coverage of private conspiracies, they were equally emphatic that
they did not believe, in the words of Representative Cook, "that Congress
115 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 gives
Congress authority to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution" the powers vested in it by article I. The broad scope of this authority was established
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), where Justice Marshall stated:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
Id. at 421.
116 Of course, whether Congress would ever enact such a code is another matter. As
Professor Cox has stated, the "possession of congressional power should not be confused with
its exercise." Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HA~v. L. Rav. 91, 119 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Foreword].
117 See Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240, 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (mem.), modified in
part and aff'd, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane); Note, Civil Actions for Damages
Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TExAs L. REv. 1015, 1019 (1967).
118 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-07 (1945). See also 47 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
584, 592 (1972).
119 403 U.S. at 99-101.
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has a right to punish an assault and battery when committed by two or
more persons within a State."'
120
It is doubtful, then, that the Court would adopt the Eighth and Fifth Circuits'
novel interpretation of Congress' fourteenth amendment jurisdiction.'
This denunciation of Action and the original Westberry opinion must not
be inferred to be an acceptance of Dombrowski and Bellamy. The times will not
permit, and the Constitution does not require, that § 1985(3)'s fourteenth
amendment jurisdiction be limited by the traditional, restrictive requirement of
positive state involvement. Professor Cox comments that the need for flexibility
in our constitutional efforts to ameliorate racial tensions is equally applicable to
the protection of fourteenth amendment rights in general:
Of [long]-range significance is the force of the idea that modem govern-
ment has affirmative duties to its citizens in the realm of human rights....
The conditions and philosophy of modern society are different from those
of 1868. The first requires and the second encompasses affirmative state
action to provide both material welfare and human rights.122
It is necessary to strike a balance between a strict constructionist approach
which stifles our political and social development and the Action-Westberry
approach which virtually ignores the wording of the provisions it purports to
construe.
120 Id. at 101-02, quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1871).
121 In a footnote to Westberry, the Fifth Circuit suggested an equally untenable and far-
reaching alternative theory in support of legislative jurisdiction to protect the "rights" of speech
and association from private interference:
We note in this context that legislative jurisdiction in this case may not even require
a Fourteenth Amendment basis. In [Griffin], the right to interstate travel was used as
an alternative basis for the Court's holding. Justice Stewart noted that "the 'right to
pass freely from state to state' " has been explicitly recognized as "among the rights
and privileges of national citizenship." [403 U.S. at 106.] Many commentators agree
with the Court that such a right is an -aspect of the fundamental liberties to be
guaranteed all Americans. But no theory which has come to our attention holds that
such a right is more "fundamental" than the rights guaranteed in the First Amend-
ment or explains why that principle should apply against "private' actions where First
Amendment principles should not. Thus we conclude that the rationale the Supreme
Court relied upon to support this conception of the right to travel-as a kind of basic
interest protected against all-should be applicable to the rights of speech and asso-
ciation as well.
507 F.2d at 211 n.7 (citation omitted). Accord, Jewish War Veterans v. American Nazi Party,
260 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
However, while the Supreme Court may well have deemed the right to travel to be an
"exceptional [freedom] uniquely requiring complete and absolute protection," Bellamy, 508
F.2d at 508 (Judge Morgan concurring in the result), it would not seem wise to extend that
reasoning to first amendment guarantees and eliminate thereby the express governmental limita-
tions on those rights by redefining them as "fundamental." The problem is the same as that
with the fourteenth amendment theory above; it has the potential effect of eliminating the "state
action" requirement from the entire Bill of Rights. If we accept the proposition that the rights
of association and speech are no less fundamental than the right to travel and should therefore
be protected against private as well as governmental interference, who is to say that freedom of
religion is any less fundamental? And what of the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures? It is suggested that if followed -and logically extended this novel theory en-
courages a disruption of the constitutionally defined federal-state relations to an extent that
should only be brought about by constitutional amendment.




In cases similar to Guest, where the state has provided public facilities,
Congress should not be required to distinguish between state and private inter-
ference when fashioning a civil remedy like that provided in § 1985 (3). Indeed,
this principle could be extended to all situations in which there is at least indirect
state involvement, for while it enlarges the scope of state action it does not
abrogate its requirement. Many writers maintain that this is precisely the ration-
ale employed by Guest.'
It must be emphasized that the critical issue of this discussion is whether
§ 1985(3) is within the permissible scope of Congress' § 5 implementative
powers. The theory espoused here is that the restrictive provisions of § 1 should
not ipso facto dictate or delimit Congress' § 5 jurisdiction to ensure equal protec-
tion of the laws. While it would be improper to read out the express limitations
of § 1 entirely, it is reasonable to assert that a lesser degree of state involvement
is required when Congress invokes its § 5 powers to protect § 1 guarantees." 4
An "indirect state action" theory abolishes the traditional requirement of
state involvement in the actual discriminatory conduct.'25 Just as sensitive 20th
century Justices have found state action in increasingly attenuated situations, 2 '
Congress should not be obliged to comply with a strict state action requirement
when enacting legislation pursuant to § 5. When a state takes affirmative action
such as constructing a public facility, the fourteenth amendment imposes certain
duties on that state and concomitantly grants certain correlative rights to those
who use that facility. It is this affirmative, albeit indirect, state involvement
which should be deemed sufficient to enable Congress to enact legislation such
as § 1985(3) pursuant to its § 5 powers.
V. Conclusion
As Justice Frankfurter often noted, proof of a wrong is not by itself sufficient
to justify judicial, still less constitutional, intervention. 2 " Certainly there are many
valid arguments which would support a constitutional amendment proscribing
wholly private interferences with rights and freedoms now protected only from
state interference. But until the adoption of such an amendment, it would be
usurpatious, and jurisprudently unwise, for the courts to write the amendment
by judicial decree. There is unquestionable truth in the words of Judge Gold-
berg in Westberry:
123 See 52 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 589 (1967) ; 45 TExAs L. REv. 168, 174 (1966).
124 The Supreme Court has held that such congressional findings are entitled to great
deference. See generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
125 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
(1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S.
244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v.
Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461(1953); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
127 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 269-70 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
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Constitutional viability is not a theorem, it is a fact in our volatile juris-
prudence, without which the past would stultify the present and the heavy
hand of history would stunt our ethical growth and enervate our powers to
meet governmental responsibilities.
2 8
There is, however, a fine line between sensitive activism and sheer disregard for
the very words of the law being construed. The decisions made by courts in
cases like Action and Westberry (if followed), which go far afield of express
constitutional provisions, are decisions to be made by the body of people who
originally bound themselves to those provisions. As Judge Learned Hand once
observed, it is they who must decide the issue:
A society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; ...
a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; . . . in a society
which evades its responsibilities by thrusting upon courts the nurture of that
spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.1
29
Virgil L. Roth
128 507 F.2d at 215.
129 Hand, The Contributions of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SuPREMP
JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1692-1942, at 66 (Mass. Bar Ass'n ed. 1942).
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